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Abstract 
 To date, the literature on campus crimes and its determinants has 
been largely descriptive and narrowly focused utilizing only regional cross-
sectional data. By examining the factors that influence campus crimes 
utilizing a national panel collected from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report 
from 2000 to 2010, this paper helps to fill the under-researched aspect of 
how policing and campus setting influence campus crimes, both those of a 
violent and non-violent nature. Empirical evidence presented here suggests 
that there are significant differences in the effectiveness of policing by 
census region, by degree of urbanization, and by campus setting. Results 
suggest that the policing elasticities of crime are higher in the Northeast and 
Midwest than in the South and West. The nationwide campus policing 
elasticity suggests that a 10% increase in the campus police force would lead 
to a 10.5% to 17.6% decrease in campus crime.   
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Introduction 
 Mass media as well as campus officials have focused increasing 
attention on campus crime in recent years in light of the tragic shootings 
around the globe, particularly in the United States. The attention given to 
these high-profile incidents has helped create the impression that college 
campuses are potentially dangerous places. While the vast majority of 
campus crimes are neither deadly nor of a violent nature, campus crime is 
still important to study, since college enrollments have continued to increase 
due to the ever-increasing importance placed on obtaining a college degree. 
According to the National Center for Education Statistics (2012), enrollment 
at American collegiate institutions increased nine-fold from about 2.4 million 
in 1948 to about 21.6 million for the fall semester 2010 while the US 
population doubled from about 147 million in 1948 to about 309 million in 
2010.  
European Scientific Journal October  2014 edition vol.10, No.28  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
51 
The enrollment growth rate of colleges and universities is outpacing 
the population growth rate of the nation, but fortunately the crime rates for 
both college campuses and for the nation as a whole have been decreasing in 
recent years. During the period from 2003 to 2010, the violent crime rate in 
the nation decreased by about 15% while the violent crime rate on college 
campuses decreased by 6%. The property crime rate for the nation and for 
college campuses decreased by 18% from 2003 to 2010 while the campus 
property crime rate decreased at about the same pace by 16.7%. Crime on 
campuses has implications for students’ development—both socially and 
academically—as they are less likely to be actively engaged on campus in 
high crime environments.  
Since the passage of the Clery Act of 1990, which requires colleges 
and universities to report the number of major crimes that occur on their 
campuses each year, campus safety has been a major public-policy issue. 
Discussions of policies to reduce campus crime have continued to gain 
media attention in recent years, highlighting the importance of a clear 
understanding of the determinants of campus crime. Student enrollment is an 
important determinant in the level of campus crime, and this relationship 
carries policy implications for when colleges and universities decide their 
admission selectivity procedures. The number of on-campus police officers 
impacts the crime level on all campuses across the nation, as the level of the 
police force is directly related to the deterrence of crime. 
Community colleges have seen increasingly higher rates of 
enrollment over the past twenty years with many students deciding to take 
college courses part-time, during the evenings, close to their place of 
employment or home, and to gain necessary skills for career advancement. 
The structure of most junior colleges in the nation differs from that of four-
year universities, as the residential model is no longer employed where 
students live in dorms and are an active part of the campus life and 
community at all hours of the day. We seek to explain how community 
colleges differ from four-year universities with regards to their crime levels. 
This paper seeks to explore the effectiveness of policing in deterring 
crime as well as drawing comparisons between the effectiveness of deterring 
crime by campus setting, by degree of urbanization, and by Census region. 
By utilizing a national panel dataset from 2000 to 2010, we attempt to shed 
light on the major public policy issue of reducing campus crime. We utilize 
an instrumental variables approach to estimate the effect that policing has on 
deterring crime in order to eliminate the inherent simultaneity bias between 
policing and crime.   
  The paper begins with a review of the literature, discusses the data 
and the model, and continues to present and discuss the empirical results. We 
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conclude with a discussion of further extensions for future research as well 
as addressing the limitations of our analysis and policy conclusions.   
 
Literature review 
 The antecedent literature relating to campus crimes is largely 
behavioral in nature, and the very few studies that have been conducted have 
been either merely descriptive or regionally based. Utilizing an econometric 
model, McPheters (1978) was the first to attempt to examine the relationship 
between campus crime and security activity as well as a number of other 
campus and off-campus variables. Crime data for the study were taken from 
the FBI's 1975 Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). McPheters found that 
campuses with higher levels of security expenditures tended to have higher 
rates of crime.  
McPheters (1978) also discovered that the proportion of students 
living in dormitories and campuses that were located in close proximity to 
urban areas with high unemployment seemed to contribute to reported crime. 
Being located in an urban area alone was not significantly correlated with 
campus crime. His theory suggested that the insignificance of location as an 
indicator of campus crime could be partially explained by an exchange of 
risk factors. For instance, a small dormitory population would be seen as a 
low-risk factor since there is a tightly knit community; however, if this small 
dormitory population is in a large city, it has a high risk factor and it is 
theorized that the location effects would be neutralized. The McPheters study 
was severely limited by the small sample size and its generalizability is 
limited today as the college landscape is much larger and diverse than in the 
time of the study.  
 Fox and Hellman (1985), utilizing the 1980 FBI Uniform Crime 
Report, conducted a study of the factors that influence campus crime rates. 
Their study used data from 222 campuses and was published several years 
prior to the explosion of media attention to campus crime following the case 
of Jeanne Ann Clery. The authors found that colleges and universities have 
less crime than their surrounding communities, and that location had no 
influence on the ratio of campus to community crimes. They also discovered 
positive and significant correlations between campus crime and tuition cost, 
the percent of male students, population density, and campus police staffing 
levels.  
 Volkwein, Szelest, and Lizotte (1995) draw upon merged national 
databases containing federal crime statistics, community demographic data, 
and campus characteristics in order to examine the relationship of campus 
crime to campus and student characteristics. Their study found that there are 
major differences in crime rates between two-year colleges and four-year 
universities due to the residential nature of four-year universities that 
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changes the campus landscape. Another finding was that campus mission, 
wealth, and student characteristics (such as the percentage of African 
American students and the per student revenues) are the best predictors of 
campus crime. The authors also find no compelling evidence of crime 
spillovers from the community to campus environments. Lastly, they find a 
significant positive relationship between campus property crime and campus 
police staffing.  
 Fisher (1995) provides a discussion of the legal, legislative, and 
administrative responses to victimization and fear on campuses. The passage 
of the Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act of 1990 mandated 
postsecondary schools to publicly report certain crime statistics and security 
policies—and has led to the media’s attention towards crime data of 
universities nationwide. She posited that the schools that were in compliance 
with the Campus Security Act would offer at least one crime awareness or 
prevention program in an effort to both reduce crime rates and make the 
campus safer by informing students. The author notes that many campuses 
had already installed blue-light emergency telephones or alarms in an 
attempt to complement the effects of the university police.  
 Lin (2009) analyzed the deterrence effect of police on crime utilizing 
state-level data from the Uniform Crime Report issued by the FBI. Within 
this analysis, tax rates were used as instrumental variables to estimate the 
effects of police presence on crime, under the notion in which: a change in 
tax rates leads to a change in revenue which changes the local government 
revenue from the state and in turn, this is related to a change in number of 
police which are related to a change in crime. Using OLS and 2SLS, the 
author finds that the police presence has a negative impact on crime. The 
2SLS model resulted with an estimated elasticity of -0.9 for property crimes 
and -1.1 for violent crimes indicating that there is indeed a decrease in crime 
when police are increased. This study serves as a valuable asset for 
understanding the importance in utilizing police in an effort to decrease 
crime rates, even within a campus setting. Although the study was not done 
with respect to college campuses, the concept that crime is rational applies to 
both society and college campuses and therefore the impact of police should 
have at least a comparable impact on college campuses as well as in society.  
 Most recently, Cook, Gottfredson, and Na (2010) published a paper 
that discusses the steps necessary for crime control and prevention. Their 
study provides numerous policy implications that can be further studied once 
an understanding of the empirical relationship between campus crime and 
such variables as enrollment levels, police staffing, regional factors, and 
campus type is developed. Such policy implications that need empirical 
verification are: campuses will experience lower levels of crime when the 
schools monitor students (through such activities as employing a large police 
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staff) and control access to campus; and that cohesive, communal, and 
personalized environments will have the lowest crime rates. 
 The only antecedent economic analysis of campus crime examined 
the relationship between casinos and local crime rates through an analysis of 
crime data for residential colleges and universities in four Midwestern states. 
This study suggested that robberies and motor vehicle thefts, but not 
burglaries, are significantly higher in number for campuses located within 10 
miles of a casino (Hyclak, 2011). 
 Although there have been limited studies conducted in the economics 
of campus crime, there is a fairly large literature on the economics of 
community crimes. In measuring the impact of police on crime, Cameron 
(1988) found that the majority of the literature showed either no relationship 
or a positive relationship between the level of police and crime rates. These 
findings are explainable by the cross-sectional methodology that failed to 
correctly account for the inherent simultaneity bias between crime and 
policing.  
 The second wave of research on the economics of crime began in the 
1990s when researchers began to utilize larger datasets over several time 
periods. Economists utilized two techniques--Granger causality and 
instrumental variables estimation—in an attempt to account for the 
simultaneity bias that lead to a positive coefficient on the police variable. 
Marvell & Moody (1996) found that police “Granger cause” crime drops. 
They found that a 10% increase in an urban police force produced a 3% 
long-term decline in total crime. Levitt (1997) sought to correct for the 
simultaneity bias between policing and crime by utilizing the timing of 
gubernatorial elections as an instrumental variable. He estimated that an 
increase of 10% in the police force would lead to a 3% to 10% reduction in 
crime rates. Klick and Tabarrok (2005) provided strong evidence of the 
causal effect of police presence on the level of crime in Washington D.C. 
They find an elasticity of police on crime of – 0.3%.  Most recently, Evans 
and Owens (2006) used the COPS (Community Oriented Policing Services) 
program to measure the effect of police on crime and found that more police 
lead to reduced crime. The main finding of these economic studies is that 
increases in police and greater incarceration lead to reduced crime (Levitt & 
Miles, 2006). 
A study by Di Tella & Schargrodsky (2004) examines the impact 
police have on crime rates. As discussed earlier, a serious impediment in 
studying the link between police presence and crime rates is the 
simultaneous causality bias. This study provides an excellent way to mitigate 
that problem. The authors focused on three neighborhoods in the city that 
increased police presence after a terrorist attack and then compared with 
their previous history by utilizing a difference-in-differences approach. 
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Utilizing the difference-in-differences approach, an increase in police 
presence had a negative impact on car thefts, but they were localized 
impacts. By comparing the data from before an increase in police to after, 
this study found a 75% decrease in car thefts in the blocks that received 
additional police. This study further aides the literature due to the nature of 
importance on locality of police. Since the deterrent effects are local, 
campuses should be aware of this and strategically place police in the 
“problem” areas of campus assuming that campus crimes behave similarly to 
city crimes—an assumption explored by our paper.  
 This paper seeks to provide the empirical framework from which an 
understanding of the impact of policing on campus crime can be developed. 
We extend the literature on the economics of crime in the community setting 
to the campus setting. This research builds upon the previous work both by 
including an updated and national dataset and by expanding the explanatory 
power of previous studies through the examination of policing effectiveness 
by region, by campus setting, and by degree of urbanization.   
 
Economic theory of crime  
 Since the publication of Gary Becker’s “Crime and Punishment” 
(1968), the economics of crime established itself as a field for applications of 
economic theory based on the model of individual rational behavior. This 
literature has fundamentally relied upon a special case of the general theory 
of rational behavior under uncertainty: the crime deterrence principle that 
criminals respond to incentives. Crime deterrence mechanisms considered in 
the literature have focused on law enforcement measures in relation to 
increasing the probability of punishment that a criminal perceives. This 
probability of punishment can be increased by strengthening the presence of 
law enforcement officers.   
 Crime imposes tremendous costs on a society. Becker distinguished 
several types of costs that crimes bring to society: (i) cost of offenses such as 
a lower level of wealth and productivity or loss of human life, (ii) public 
expenditures on police and courts, (iii) public expenditure on imprisonment 
of offenders, and (iv) private expenditures on protection.  
 The first step for an economic approach to reducing crime is an 
understanding of a basic assumption: crime is rational. One chooses to 
partake in criminal activity because it is the most profitable option available 
to the criminal. The marginal utility of crime is higher than the marginal 
utility stemming from other activities, thereby creating the incentive for the 
criminal to engage in criminal activity. This leads to the conclusion that the 
most efficient way to deter crime is not to attempt to eliminate crime but 
rather to reduce the profitability of crime. We can reduce the profitability of 
crime by increasing the probability of being caught or by increasing the 
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punishment. The focus in this paper is on increasing the probability of being 
caught through increasing the level of police presence since universities have 
a direct influence on this policy, whereas the legal system determines the 
punishments.  
Eide, Rubin & Shepherd (2006) provide a comprehensive review of 
the economics of criminal behavior. Economic models of criminal behavior 
must represent the gains and losses associated with criminal behavior such 
that all the benefits and costs that effect individual decision making are 
accounted for. The optimality condition resulting from the utility maximizing 
framework is that people will allocate time to criminal activity until the 
marginal benefits equal the marginal costs. The law-abiding individuals will 
normally have marginal benefits lower than the marginal costs. The gains 
that contribute to the marginal benefits include: monetary benefits such as 
those obtained from theft or robbery and psychic rewards such as the thrill of 
danger, peer approval, a sense of accomplishment, or the satisfaction of 
wants (as in the case of rape). Costs associated with criminal activity include 
the material costs, psychic costs, expected punishment costs, and opportunity 
costs associated with the decision to engage in criminal activity. Individual 
discount rates are also an important consideration in determining the benefits 
and costs of engaging in criminal behavior. An individual with a high 
discount rate will tend to engage in more criminal behavior than an 
individual with a low discount rate ceteris paribus.  
 The importance of policing a college campus stems from the 
assumption that an increase in police results in a decrease in crime. An 
increase in police should increase the marginal cost of crime and criminals 
would thus find it more costly to engage in criminal behavior. Police are 
valuable in deterring crime for a variety of reasons, but the very basic one is 
that by being seen, they act as a deterrent to crime because they increase the 
probability of getting caught for the criminal. In an effort to present the most 
valuable conclusion for how a college campus should staff their police force, 
we will analyze this relationship. 
 We expect that the incidence of each of the types of crime will be 
lessened by an increase in the police force. The incidence of pre-meditated 
crimes (such as murder or rape) will be affected less by an increase in 
policing than the opportunistic crimes (such as burglary or motor vehicle 
theft). Police lessen the opportunity criminals have to commit crimes. 
Therefore, the larger the opportunity cost of the crime, the more impact 
police will have on reducing crime. This can help in determining how to 
utilize police forces depending on the area of patrol. A university for 
instance, would have more opportunistic crimes than pre-meditated and 
therefore an increase in police on campus should have a very significant 
impact on crime rates. 
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Crime is a social behavior that can be associated with incentives, as 
with any economic decision. Through an empirical analysis of the 
relationship between police and crime and the various characteristics of 
college campuses, we can identify persisting relationships that aid 
policymakers in determining the optimal allocation of scarce resources. 
 
Contribution of Criminal Justice Theories to the Economics of Crime  
 The criminal justice literature nicely complements the literature on 
the economics of crime. Economic theories are based upon the rational utility 
maximizing individual and preferences are usually assumed to be constant 
while norms are neglected. In contrast, criminological theories recognize the 
contribution of economics to the study of crime but suggest that an 
individual’s environment has a significant impact on preferences and 
individual norms. One immediate difference between the criminal justice 
literature and the economics literature on crime is that economists have 
always attributed a statistically insignificant or positive impact of police on 
crime to a simultaneity problem; whereas, the criminal justice literature 
recognizes that police have many other duties than crime prevention and that 
only large increases in police resources may have a noticeable effect on 
crime. Moreover, the criminal justice literature recognizes the intuition of 
why there may be a positive or insignificant correlation between police and 
crime and explains this theoretically. The two main perspectives in 
criminological theory—the classical perspective and the positive 
perspective—help to shed light on our economic understanding of crime.  
 The most important assumption necessary in applying deterrence 
theory to policy is that individuals are rational. Research in behavioral 
economics and criminology suggests that people often engage in behaviors 
that they know are irrational and individuals’ cognitive differences can limit 
rational decision making. This limitation is referred to as bounded rationality 
and it is not surprising that some studies find that attempts by police to deter 
potential offenders do not have much effect in preventing crime. The simple 
existence of a policing authority tends to deter people to some extent (Pratt, 
2008). Thus, bounded rationality is one reason that a positive effect of 
policing on crime may not be surprising.  
 The classical perspective in criminological theory consists of two 
main theories: the rational choice theory and the routine activities theory. 
Rational choice theory is one that criminologists have adapted from 
economists and is the standard approach in studying the economics of crime. 
Under rational choice theory, an increase in police would reduce crime by 
reducing the incentives for criminals to engage in criminal activity (i.e. the 
opportunity cost of committing crime increases with a larger police force). 
Deterrence theory asserts that the certainty, severity and swiftness of a 
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punishment impact the effectiveness of a particular sanction. The certainty of 
punishment increases when the number of police officers increases since 
there is a higher probability of punishment due to the large police presence. 
Thus, classical deterrence theory provides a justification for increasing the 
number of police officers since it would increase the certainty of punishment.  
 Routine activities theory also assumes a rational decision-making 
offender and its framework emphasizes the presence of three factors that 
come together in time and place to create a high likelihood of crime and 
victimization. This theory considers the situational nature of crime since it 
assumes that most crime occurs during the daily routines of individuals who 
see and take opportunities to commit crime. The three factors that create a 
high likelihood of crime are a motivated offender, a vulnerable target, and a 
lack of guardianship.  Locations that have a high convergence of these three 
factors are known as “hot spots”. Figure 1 presents this relationship in the 
routine activities theory. This theory provides sufficient reason for campus 
policing since college students are often vulnerable targets and without a 
lack of guardianship, motivated offenders would be more plentiful since they 
would seize more opportunities to commit crime that exist in their daily 
routines.  
 
Figure 1: Routine Activities Theory (adapted from Tibbetts, p. 60, 2012) 
 
 The positive school perspective in criminological theory is that 
criminal behavior is the result of determinism, meaning that factors such as 
poverty, intelligence, early life experiences, and unemployment influence an 
individual’s criminal behavior rather than rational decision making. One 
policy for college campuses stemming from this perspective is that crime 
awareness programs and college adjustment programs may be beneficial so 
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that students are aware of resources that are available to them (such as 
tutoring, career assistance, food bank programs, etc.), so that crime is 
prevented on a primary level.  
 Robert Sampson and John Laub (1993) proposed a developmental 
framework in criminological theory that emphasizes the importance of 
particular life events and life changes that impact an individual’s decision to 
commit criminal activity. They strongly emphasize the salience of 
transitionary events such as marriage, employment, and military service in 
determining a person’s criminal trajectory. Most importantly, they found that 
social structure factors such as poverty and family structure lead to problems 
in social and educational development, which in turn, impacts crime. Their 
research provides justification based on the social structure factors for why 
we would expect urban areas to have more crime than rural areas.  
 A recent contribution of the criminology literature to the 
understanding of crime is John Eck’s application of the routine activity 
theory to policing. Eck (2003) emphasizes in his theory that police serve 
three roles: they handle offenders, guard targets/victims, and manage places. 
An increase in police does not necessarily mean that the police are utilizing 
the majority of their time to guard targets/victims and manage places; it 
could be that they spend a large amount of time engaging in administrative 
roles. Due to these multiple roles that police serve, the criminal justice 
literature provides the reasoning of why we might expect a positive or 
insignificant coefficient on the effect of police on crime. 
 Our policing variable in this study is the total number of law 
enforcement employees, total officers, and total civilians employed by the 
respective universities and colleges to deter crime. The criminal justice 
literature provides some essential observations about policing that serve to 
caution the reader when interpreting the policing elasticity of crime.  First, 
police officers may be either deputies or patrol officers. If a university adds 
new police officers, they do not necessarily contribute to the deterrence 
efforts if their primary functions are administrative rather than patrolling. 
Another confounding factor is the overlapping jurisdictions of policing. 
When campuses have agreements with their local and state police forces, the 
policing variable for the campus may understate the degree of police 
presence on campus. For instance, a local police force adding officers will 
change the police elasticity of campus crime as long as the additional local 
officers contribute to the patrolling of the campus. Lastly, not all campus 
police officers are sworn officers (i.e. they have not taken an oath and do not 
have the power to arrest and detain individuals).  
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Data & empirical methodology   
 This paper utilizes data on known offenses that were obtained from 
the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report (UCR). The sample contains 2,860 
observations spanning from 2000 to 2010 for 260 colleges and universities. 
Two datasets were combined: one contained the crime levels10 on each 
campus and the second dataset contained the number of law enforcement 
officers employed by the respective colleges and universities. All colleges 
and universities that reported to the Uniform Crime Reporting Program are 
included in the dataset as long as the following data were complete in the 
FBI database: 2000 – 2010 crime levels, enrollment levels, policing levels, 
and tuition levels.11 UCR data is most useful for understanding trends in the 
data. However, in addition to non-reporting, the UCR data does have other 
limitations. For example, crimes of a sexual or violent nature tend to be 
underreported since universities have a vested interest in handling these 
crimes unofficially (Tibbetts, 2012). In addition, campus police departments 
are adept to the reporting process and may seek to maximize their 
government revenue by over-reporting particular crimes. 
The measure of crime is aggregated to include both violent crime 
(murder and nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and 
aggravated assault) and property crime (burglary, larceny-theft, and motor 
vehicle theft) as reported by university/college law enforcement agencies 
that report data to the UCR Program. We model our regression specifications 
in terms of total crime levels; however, our results are robust to utilizing per 
capita crime and per capita police specifications as well.  
To study the impact of policing on the campus crime level, we model 
our multivariate regression analysis utilizing a panel data approach with 
university-level fixed effects.  Our empirical model (1) is as follows: ln(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡)=  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 ln(𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡) +  𝛽2𝑙𝑛 (𝐸𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡)+  𝛽3𝐶𝑜𝑚𝐶𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑈𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖+ 𝛽6𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 
 The police staff level variable, Policeit, represents the total number of 
law enforcement employees, total officers, and total civilians employed by 
the respective universities and colleges, i, in year t to deter crime. Our 
enrollment variable, Enrollmentit, takes into account both part-time and full-
time students and include observations from four-year universities, junior 
                                                          
10 We utilize crime levels rather than rates since the offenders on campuses are not limited to 
the student body. The per capita results (crime rates) are presented as a robustness check in 
the results section.  
11 All public universities and colleges are required to report crime data under the Clery Act. 
However, data are missing for some years for particular colleges. Illinois data is not 
included in our dataset due to multiple missing observations. 
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colleges, and health and medical centers. ComCollegei is a binary variable 
for whether the campus is a community college. The campus setting variable, 
Residentiali, is an indicator variable for whether the campus is primarily 
residential or primarily commuter. This measure is based upon the Carnegie 
Classification of Size and Setting where campuses are classified by the 
degree in which they are residential. Degree of urbanization, Urbanizationi, 
is based on urban-centric locale codes that were assigned through a 
methodology developed by the U.S. Census Bureau’s Population Division. 
The locale codes identify the geographic status of a school on an urban 
continuum ranging from “large city” to “rural”. In the first portion of our 
study, we define an urban setting to be one lying on the continuum between 
“suburb: midsize” to “city: large”. Similarly, we define a rural setting to be 
one lying on the continuum between “rural: remote” to “town: fringe”. 
Regioni represents a vector of regional dummies for each of the U.S. Census 
regions. Institutional-level fixed effects, 𝛼𝑖, are also included in our 
specification.  
 We expect the coefficient on police to be negative since an increase 
in the police level should lead to a reduced tendency for more crimes to be 
committed in the student body. However, it is plausible that the coefficient 
on police could be positive or insignificant since an increase in the police 
force may be primarily utilized for activities other than crime prevention. 
Many factors in addition to policing affect the crime level on college 
campuses, including enrollment numbers, the degree of urbanization of the 
surrounding area, whether the campus is primarily residential or commuter, 
the structure of the college as either a community college or a four year, and 
crime reduction programs such as campus escort services.  
The enrollment level and the crime level are hypothesized to have a 
positive relationship. Basic intuition tells us that as a campus becomes more 
populated, the crime level will increase given the increased opportunity to 
commit crimes.  Nolan (2004) goes into detail about the effects of population 
growth on crime rates; his results show that there is indeed a positive 
relationship between higher populations and higher crime rates. His analysis 
of the 2000 UCR crime data for 1,294 cities with populations over 25,000 
revealed a significant positive relationship between crime rate and 
population size, indicating that the higher populated cities reported the 
higher crime rates.  
 Another factor in determining campus crime levels and type is 
examining whether a campus is primarily residential or commuter. This 
factor is very important since on residential campuses students are on 
campus most of the time and with commuter campuses students do not stay 
on campus and commute to school on a daily basis. If a large portion of the 
student body lives on campus, then they have more time and greater 
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opportunity to commit campus crimes or be victims of crime, therefore 
raising the crime levels at the schools that are primarily residential. Since 
residential colleges typically have high amounts of campus housing, this 
brings in a larger level of crime that commuter colleges do not experience. 
For example, more personal property is brought onto residential campuses 
giving students more opportunity to commit crimes such as robbery, 
burglary, larceny/theft and property crimes. Students being around other 
students’ property at all times and having access to other’s living quarters 
provides opportunity for property crime. Another factor to consider with 
students living on campus is that daily activities such as showering, 
changing, and college partying occur which increases the chance of sexual 
assault crimes to rise compared to commuter schools. Therefore, we expect 
that residential campuses will have higher crime levels than their counterpart 
commuter campuses. Interestingly, the Chicago School in criminology 
defines a slum as an area exhibiting three characteristics: heterogeneity, 
poverty, and mobility. The criminal justice literature clearly shows that slum 
areas experience higher crime. A campus dormitory is similar to a slum in 
that it exhibits the same three characteristics in general. Students living in 
dorms are from various backgrounds (heterogeneity), may not have much 
income (poverty), and dorms have a high turnover rate in occupancy 
(mobility).  While dorms are certainly not slums as most people consider the 
term, the similarity in these characteristics leads us to expect higher crime 
for residential campuses where a large portion of students live in dormitories.  
We expect that urban areas will experience higher levels of campus 
crime than their rural counterparts due to the proximity to high levels of 
activity from surrounding areas and the larger population that has access to 
campus. In considering the levels and type of crime by urban setting, we use 
the entire urban continuum rather than identifying portions as “rural” and 
“urban”.  
When analyzing our estimates across regions, we utilize the U.S. 
Census Bureau’s classification of four regions: Northeast, Midwest, South, 
and West. Studies from criminal justice indicate that community crimes are 
often higher in the South and West than in the Northeast and Midwest, so we 
expect this to be the case in our model of the determinants of campus crime 
(Tibbetts, p. 21, 2012). One plausible explanation for this result is that the 
poverty levels in the South and West are higher and this may be a driving 
force for the higher level of community crimes.   
 In order to correct for the problem of endogeneity (i.e. the 
simultaneous determination of policing and crime), we instrument the 
policing variable by utilizing a presidential dummy variable and a tuition 
level variable. The presidential dummy variable indicates whether the 
president of the institution changed in a given year. We hypothesize that a 
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presidential change impacts the amount of resources that are devoted to 
campus police and the subsequent hiring or firing of police employees as 
new budgets and priorities are proposed under new presidents. This 
hypothesis has been confirmed at the county level by Levitt successfully 
instrumenting his policing variable by the gubernatorial election year 
variable (Levitt, 1997). Our second instrument is the tuition level which is 
hypothesized to be related to the level of police on campus since an increase 
in tuition may allow the university more funds that can be allocated to the 
police staff. We expect our tuition instrument to be exogenous because 
tuition is not determined by a university in most cases, and is instead 
determined at the state level.  
Summary statistics for our dependent variables (the measures of 
campus crime level), key independent variables, instrumental variables and 
per capita variables are provided in Table 1. The average number of crimes 
in our sample was 219.04 with 5.72 being violent crimes, on average. The 
average campus had 1.15 forcible rapes during a given year. We have 1,408 
observations where no forcible rapes were committed on a given campus. 
Although this number may seem very small, it is important to recognize that 
reported forcible rapes do not take into account the sexual assaults that are 
not reported by the victims. A recent study done by the National Institute of 
Justice (2006) estimated that one-fifth to one-fourth of women in college are 
victims of sexual assault. The average campus in our sample experienced 
about 213 property crimes during a given year. The largest component of this 
was larceny/theft with a mean of 179.93 crimes.  
We find that the average enrollment level for our sample was about 
15,361 students. The average number of campus law enforcement officers 
employed was about 34.67. Our sample also includes 10% community 
colleges as we are interested in the difference between community colleges 
and four-year universities’ crime levels. The presidential change dummy 
variable and the tuition variable instrument the endogenous police employees 
measure. The average tuition level for a university in a given year of our 
sample is approximately $19,885. We also find that 8% of our sample had 
presidential changes over the sample period. 
It is also useful to report the per capita crime levels as well so that a 
judgment can be made as to how many crimes per student enrolled are 
committed. Table 1 also presents the per capita total crimes and per capita 
police employees. It indicates that the average college or university in our 
sample had 15 crimes per 1,000 students enrolled and about 3 law 
enforcement officers per 1,000 students enrolled. On average, there was 1 
property crime for every 70 students and 1 violent crime for every 2,326 
students.   
 
European Scientific Journal October  2014 edition vol.10, No.28  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
64 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable 
 
Mean 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
Variable 
 
Mean 
(Standard 
Deviation) 
Total Crimes 
 
219.04 
(222.38) 
Enrollment 
 
15,360.6 
(10,951.3) 
Violent Crimes 
 
5.72 
(7.00) 
Total Police employees 
 
34.67 
(28.62) 
Murder 
 
0.013 
(0.120) 
Community College 
 
0.10 
(0.30) 
Rape 
 
1.15 
(1.73) 
Presidential Change 
 
0.08 
(0.27) 
Aggravated 
Assault 
3.00 
(4.14) 
Tuition 
 
19,885.14 
(10,177.79) 
Robbery 
 
1.55 
(2.96) 
Total Crimes per capita 
 
0.0147 
(0.0111) 
Property 
Crimes  
212.65 
(216.62) 
Violent Crimes per capita 
 
0.00043 
(0.00058) 
Burglary 
 
25.43 
(32.94) 
Property Crimes per capita 0.0142 
(0.01085) 
Larceny/Theft 
 
179.93 
(185.39) 
Campus Police Employees 
per capita 
0.0026 
(0.0019) 
Motor Vehicle 
Theft 
7.02 
(12.11) 
  
Arson 
 
1.02 
(2.35) 
  
 
 Since we are interested in the differences in policing by degree of 
urbanization and by campus setting, we conduct difference-in-mean tests to 
see if there is a statistical difference in our key variables by degree of 
urbanization and by campus setting. Our results are presented in Table 2 and 
we conclude that there are statistical differences in crime levels, enrollment 
levels, and policing between urban campuses and rural campuses as well as 
between campus settings. Namely, we find at the 1% level of significance 
that urban campuses have more crimes, a larger enrollment, and a larger 
campus police force than rural campuses. In considering campus settings, we 
find that residential campuses have higher crime levels and policing than 
commuter campuses, but residential campuses have enrollments that are 
lower than commuter campuses.  
Table 2: Difference-in-Mean Test for Urbanization & Carnegie Campus Setting 
Classification 
*** indicates significance at the 1% level 
Variable Urban 
Campuses  
Rural Campuses 
 
Difference-in-
mean  
T-stat 
LN(CRIME) 5.085 4.543 0.542*** 13.122 
LN(ENROLL) 9.523 8.977 0.546*** 18.406 
LN(POLICE) 3.411 2.749 0.662*** 20.918 
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Empirical results 
  Table 3 provides coefficient estimates of the instrumental variables 
fixed effects regression specification given by equation (1). All variables are 
statistically significant and of the expected sign. The policing variable was 
effectively instrumented in our model by the presidential change dummy 
variable and the tuition variable. The instruments were found to be strong 
and valid. The Sargan statistic indicates that our instruments are valid since 
we fail to reject the null hypothesis that the instrumental variables are 
uncorrelated with the residuals (p=0.4453). The F-statistic was also found to 
be approximately 34.81, displaying the strength of our instruments.  
The coefficient of police indicates that an increase of police will have 
a highly significant inverse impact on the campus crime level.12 For a 1% 
increase in the policing level, the number of crimes decreases by -1.405%. 
We can conclude at the 95% level of significance that the police elasticity of 
crime is elastic. That is, for a one percentage increase in total police 
employees, we can expect greater than a one percent decrease in the total 
amount of campus crimes. This finding has significant policy implications 
about police hiring at public universities. Our results become much stronger 
when we consider the effectiveness of policing by other characteristics. 
Campus police seem to be a larger deterrent for campus crime than 
community policing is a deterrent for community crimes. Previous literature 
on the effect of policing on community crimes finds an inelastic response—
for a 10% increase in police, the crime rate decreases by 3% to 10% (Levitt, 
2006).  
The coefficient of enrollment indicates that an increase of enrollment 
will have a significant positive impact on the campus crime level. For a 1% 
increase in enrollment, the number of crimes increases by 0.29%.  We find 
that community colleges have lower crime than the four-year college 
counterparts, residential colleges have higher crime levels than their non-
residential counterparts, and urban colleges experience higher campus crime 
than their rural counterparts.  
 
 
                                                          
12 When we utilize OLS, we find a positive sign for the coefficient on our policing variable 
that suggests that an increase in policing leads to an increase in crime. This shows the 
importance of instrumenting the policing variable. 
Variable Commuter 
Campus 
   Residential  
Campus 
Difference-in-
mean  
t-
Statistic 
LN(CRIME) 4.761 5.185 -0.425*** 12.036 
LN(ENROLL) 9.457 9.323 0.134*** 5.036 
LN(POLICE) 3.146 3.383 -0.237*** 8.305 
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Table 3: IV Regression Results for the Logarithm of Total Campus Crimes 
Variable IV estimation with university-level fixed 
effects 
LN(POLICE) -1.405 
(0.179)*** 
LN(ENROLL) 0.290 
(0.073)*** 
COMCOLLEGE - 0.375 
(0.138)*** 
RESIDENTIAL 2.527 
(0.238)*** 
URBANIZATION 2.025 
(0.164)*** 
CONSTANT 3.746 
(0.462)*** 
N 2858 
Absolute values of standard errors are in parentheses. 
An *, **, ***, indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively 
 
We consider our results by campus setting in Table 4 utilizing the 
same approach as in the past table. We find that for a 1% increase in 
enrollment, the number of campus crimes increases by 0.759% in campuses 
that are primarily commuter campuses and increases by 1.717% in primarily 
residential campuses. This result suggests that the enrollment elasticity of 
crime is inelastic for commuter campuses, but highly elastic for residential 
campuses as intuition would suggest. More interestingly, for a 1% increase 
in the policing level, the number of campus crimes changes by – 0.734% in 
commuter campuses and – 2.772% in residential campuses. The policing 
elasticity of crime is highly elastic for residential campuses and policing is 
more effective in deterring crime in residential campuses.  
Table 4: IV estimation with university fixed effects by Campus Setting 
Variable Primarily Commuter  Primarily Residential  
LN(POLICE) - 0.734 
(0.249)*** 
- 2.772 
(0.634)*** 
LN(ENROLL) 0.759 
(0.134)*** 
1.717 
(0.303)*** 
COMCOLLEGE - 1.254 
(0.185)*** 
- 1.953 
(0.898)** 
URBANIZATION 0.836 
(0.185)*** 
2.007 
(0.384)*** 
N 1528 1330 
 
We find that the degree of urbanization is significant in our previous 
regression specifications, so in Table 5 we utilize a similar approach as in the 
regional analysis and analyze our results by degree of urbanization. We find 
that for a 1% increase in enrollment, the number of campus crimes increases 
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by 0.234% in cities, 0.473% in suburbs, 0.192% in towns, and 1.034% in 
rural campuses. Rural campuses have the highest enrollment elasticity of 
crime.  For a 1% increase in the policing level, the number of campus crimes 
changes by – 0.931% in cities, - 1.021% in suburbs, - 0.286% in towns, and - 
1.008% in rural campuses. The policing elasticities of crime are not 
statistically different for cities, suburbs, and rural areas.  
Table 5: IV estimation with university fixed effects by Urbanization 
Variable City Suburb Town Rural 
LN(POLICE) - 0.931 (0.186)*** 
- 1.021 
(0.309)*** 
- 0.286 
(0.191)* 
- 1.008 
(0.588)* 
LN(ENROLL) 0.234 (0.082)*** 
0.473 
(0.143)*** 
0.192 
(0.370) 
1.034 
(0.311)*** 
COMCOLLEGE - 4.764 (0.445)*** 
- 0.939 
(0.839) 
- 0.948 
(1.827) 
- 0.851 
(0.355)** 
RESIDENTIAL - 4.450 (0.359)*** 
5.986 
(1.10)*** 
5.212 
(2.557)** 
1.053 
(0.369)*** 
N 1649 538 495 176 
 
In Table 6, we estimate variation in crime by U.S. Census region. We 
find that for a 1% increase in enrollment, the number of crimes increases by 
0.197% in the Northeast, 0.668% in the South, 0.513% in the Midwest, and 
0.875% in the West. Our results for the enrollment elasticity of crime are 
significant at the 1% level for the South, Midwest and West but insignificant 
in the Northeast. The coefficient on police indicates that an increase of police 
will have a highly significant inverse impact on the campus crime level. For 
a 1% increase in the policing level, the number of crimes changes by - 
1.933% in the Northeast, - 0.422% in the South, - 2.636% in the Midwest, 
and – 0.776% in the West. These results for the policing elasticity of crime 
are significant at the 1% level for the Northeast, Midwest, and West and 
significant at the 10% level for the South. These results suggest that policing 
is relatively more effective, on average, in the Northeast and Midwest than it 
is in the South and West. This raises policy questions that can be further 
investigated. For instance, the investment in policing in the Northeast and 
Midwest may be generating a greater return since the responsiveness is 
elastic, whereas, the investment in policing in the South and West is 
currently generating a lower return since the responsiveness is lower. The 
South and West may be best to invest in other forms of crime deterrence 
such as Campus Escort services and crime prevention awareness programs, 
assuming that the resources and given police technologies are the same 
across universities. It may be that the South and West should invest more in 
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their policing resources in order to increase the policing responsiveness to 
levels similar to the Northeast and Midwest where it is elastic.13  
Table 6: IV estimation with university fixed effects By Census Region: 
Variable Northeast South Midwest West 
LN(POLICE) - 1.933 (0.638)*** 
- 0.422 
(0.232)* 
- 2.636 
(0.786)*** 
- 0.776 
(0.292)*** 
LN(ENROLL) 0.197 (0.272) 
0.668 
(0.143)*** 
0.513 
(0.104)*** 
0.875 
(0.170)*** 
COMCOLLEGE - 3.292 (0.505)*** 
- 0.980 
(0.175)*** 
- 0.346 
(2.917) 
- 1.062 
(0.223)*** 
RESIDENTIAL 1.867 (0.582)*** 
0.659 
(0.126)*** 
5.212 
(2.557)** 
0.894 
(0.164)*** 
URBANIZATION 10.094 (1.717)*** 
0.606 
(0.174)*** 
7.779 
(1.365)*** 
0.748 
(0.203)*** 
N 418 1296 484 660 
 
In each of our regression specifications throughout Tables 4-6, we 
find that community colleges have a lower level of crime than their four-year 
counterparts. The equality of coefficients across equations was tested and all 
of the differences in our coefficients by specification are significant at the 
1% level. For instance, the difference between our coefficients of the 
policing elasticity of crime in the Northeast and South were tested and found 
to have a significant difference at the 1% level.  Our results have shown how 
both the enrollment elasticity of crime and the policing elasticity of crime 
vary by regions, by degree of urbanization, and by campus setting.  
 
Robustness Checks  
We also utilize the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel GMM estimator to 
cope with several potential econometric problems: the simultaneous causality 
leading the endogenous regressor to be correlated with the error term; the 
time invariant institutional characteristics may be correlated with the error 
term; the autocorrelation that results from properly taking into account the 
crime level in the previous period; and the small time dimension and larger 
institutional dimension.  
Our base specification econometric model including a lag of the total 
crime level leads to several econometric problems in estimation. First, the 
policing variable, 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡, is endogenous because causality may run in both 
directions leading the regressors to be correlated with the error term. The 
time invariant institutional characteristics (fixed effects) may be correlated 
with the explanatory variables. The fixed effects are contained in the error 
                                                          
13 It is not necessarily the effectiveness of police that is driving this result. Other regional 
and cultural factors likely have an influence as well. For instance, campuses in the Northeast 
are usually older and smaller than their counterparts elsewhere.  
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term in the equation, which consists of unobserved institution-specific 
effects, 𝑣𝑖, and the observation-specific errors, 𝑒𝑖𝑡:  
𝑢𝑖𝑡 = 𝑣𝑖 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡   (2) 
 Another problem in estimating the equation is that the presence of the 
lagged dependent variable gives rise to autocorrelation. Lastly, the panel 
dataset has a short time dimension (T=11) and a larger institution dimension 
(N=260).  
 In order to solve the first problem, we first utilized fixed-effects 
instrumental variables estimation (two-stage least squares). Our instruments, 
the presidential dummy variable and the tuition level, were found to be 
exogenous and strong. However, the strength of the instruments can always 
be improved since weak instruments cause the fixed-effects IV estimators to 
be likely biased in the way of the OLS estimators. In order to increase the 
strength of the instruments and thereby minimize the biasedness of the 
estimators, we utilize the Arellano-Bond (1991) difference GMM estimator 
first proposed by Holtz-Eakin, Newey & Rosen (1988). Instead of using only 
the exogenous instruments—the presidential dummy variable and the tuition 
level—we utilize the lagged levels of the endogenous regressors. This makes 
the endogenous variables pre-determined and, therefore, uncorrelated with 
the error term.  
 In order to cope with the second problem (fixed effects), the 
difference GMM uses first-differences to transform the equation. By 
transforming the regressors by first differencing, the fixed institutional-
specific effect is removed, because it does not vary with time.  
 The first differenced lagged dependent variable is also instrumented 
with its past levels in the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel specification. Lastly, 
the Arellano-Bond estimator was designed for when the panel dataset has a 
short time dimension and a larger institution dimension (small-T large-N 
panels). In small-T panels a shock to the university’s fixed effect, which 
shows in the error term, will not decline with time. Similarly, the correlation 
of the lagged dependent variable with the error term will be significant. In 
these cases, the Arellano-Bond estimator is preferred over the fixed-effects 
IV estimators.  
We present our results utilizing the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel 
generalized method of moments estimator in Table 7. All of our coefficient 
estimations are significant at the 1% level in this specification. We find that a 
1% increase in crimes in the previous period persists into the current period 
and leads to a 0.381% increase in crimes in the current period. The policing 
elasticity of crime is – 1.484% and the enrollment elasticity of crime is 
0.146%. These results are very similar to what we found in Table 3 utilizing 
instrumental variables estimation with university-level fixed effects.  
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Table 7: Regression Results for Total Campus Crimes 
Variable Arellano-Bond Dynamic Panel GMM 
Estimator 
LN(LAGCRIME)         0.381 
     (0.039)*** 
LN(POLICE) -1.484 
(0.389)*** 
LN(ENROLL) 0.146 
(0.038)*** 
CONSTANT 4.870 
(0.437)*** 
INSTRUMENTS 50 INSTRUMENTS 
N 2337 
 
As an additional robustness check, we utilize per capita crimes as the 
dependent variable and a per capita policing variable as the independent 
variable. However, we prefer the total crimes specification rather than 
modeling per capita level since the population at risk isn’t strictly limited to 
students. Nevertheless, all of our coefficient estimations are significant at the 
1% level in the per capita specification. We find that a 1% increase in per-
capita crimes in the previous period persists into the current period and leads 
to a 0.564% increase in per-capita crimes in the current period. The policing 
elasticity of per-capita crime is – 0.57%. 
 
Conclusion 
 This paper examined some of the determinants of campus crime, 
namely: enrollment levels, police staffing, degree of urbanization, and 
campus setting. This paper has expanded on the relevant literature by using 
an updated, national dataset that previous studies have not. Further research 
and policy implications can be drawn from this research study.  
 We found that policing is relatively more effective, on average, in the 
Northeast and Midwest than it is in the South and West. This carries the 
policy implication that campuses in the Northeast and Midwest may be best 
to increase their campus police force since the responsiveness is elastic, 
whereas, the South and Midwest may be best to invest in other forms of 
crime deterrence such as Campus Escort services and crime prevention 
awareness programs. However, clearly this area needs more investigation 
through fieldwork and survey research to generate a definitive policy 
conclusion. Furthermore, we find that the enrollment elasticity of crime is 
inelastic for commuter campuses, but highly elastic for residential campuses 
as intuition would suggest. Lastly, we found that the policing elasticity of 
crime is highly elastic for residential campuses and policing is more effective 
in deterring crime in residential campuses.  
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 Endogeneity was a problem in our model that we mitigated by 
instrumenting the police variable with the presidential dummy variable as 
well as the tuition level. We found that these instruments are successful in 
instrumenting the police variable.  The Arellano-Bond specification served 
as a robustness check for our results. We find a negative impact of police on 
crime even after taking into consideration the level of police in the prior 
period. It may be that economists have neglected to consider the reasons for 
a positive coefficient on policing; however, our results demonstrate that 
policing clearly reduces campus crime. Police may have other duties than 
crime prevention and this specification helps to account for this critique of 
the criminal justice literature on the economic approach by including the 
level of police in the prior period.    
 There are four possibilities when a crime is committed on campus: 
both the perpetrator and victim are students; both the perpetrator and victim 
are non-students; the perpetrator is a student and the victim is not a student; 
or the perpetrator is not a student and the victim is a student. One assumption 
made in our analysis was that police presence will affect each victim-
perpetrator dyad equally. We recognize that criminological theory asserts 
that police presence will not affect each dyad equally. It would be interesting 
to compute the policing elasticity of campus crime for each of the dyads if 
such data were available. 
This paper has aided the current literature in criminal justice, higher 
education, and public policy by providing the first study considering campus 
crime elasticities by region, by degree of urbanization, and by campus 
setting. The nationwide campus policing elasticity suggests that a 10% 
increase in the campus police force would lead to a 10.5% to 17.6% decrease 
in campus crime. The impact of the campus police force on campus crime is 
elastic, whereas, other studies have found that the impact of community 
policing on community crime is relatively inelastic (producing only a 3% to 
10% decrease in community crime for every 10% increase in policing). The 
results of this study may be used by policymakers to determine the potential 
effectiveness that allocating additional revenues to hiring a larger police 
force may have based upon the campus setting, region, and urbanization.    
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